Statements

 

Security Council Statements-2008

S/PV.5922
5922nd meeting
Tuesday, 24 June 2008, 10 a.m.
New York

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Mr. Ettalhi (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I am pleased to welcome Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim to the Council and to thank them for their briefings. We are highly appreciative of their endeavours in discharging their complex and difficult — but noble and lofty — mandates.
        It is regrettable that the security situation in Darfur has deteriorated during the period under consideration, as attested to by this morning’s briefings, by the reports of the Secretary-General and by what internally displaced persons (IDPs) and humanitarian workers told the Security Council mission during its visit to Darfur.
        The 10 May action by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), targeting the capital, and the ongoing violence among tribal groups, rebel movements and the Government underscore the need to accelerate the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and to ensure that it has the capacity necessary to protect civilians, in particular those in IDP camps, and humanitarian workers. The number of IDPs grows by the day, which regrettably means an increased number of people in need of assistance and protection.
        But there has been a delay, if not a disruption, in the deployment of UNAMID, due in large part to the mission’s considerable shortfall in equipment. For example, as the report indicates, the deployment of the first Egyptian battalion has been delayed owing to the absence of necessary equipment. The same is true for the Ethiopian battalion. Be they Egyptian or Ethiopian, these troops are prepared to be deployed in Darfur. Yet the camps were not ready to receive them, thereby impeding their arrival. In addition, the Nepalese and Thai troops were also late to arrive.
        We listened to the Sudanese officials whom we met during our visit expressing their unqualified cooperation in the deployment of the hybrid force. Because the deployment of the hybrid force is clearly in the interest of the Sudanese Government and, more broadly, in the interest of stability and peace, we expect that the Sudanese Government, together with the Mission, will constitute a joint team to overcome all the problems standing in the way of the deployment. The Sudanese officials clearly expressed their willingness to operate the airports in the Darfur region on a continuous 24-hour basis, although that required overcoming technical deficiencies and completing the unfinished airport infrastructure to enable them to receive the aircraft deployed for the mission. In this regard, paragraph 29 of the report contained in document S/2006/400 deserves special attention. It reads as follows:
                “Despite ongoing efforts, critical mission capabilities are still lacking, namely, 18 medium utility helicopters, six attack helicopters, one aerial reconnaissance unit, one medium transport unit, one heavy transport unit and one multi-role logistics unit.”
Once again, the mission is regrettably still facing deficiencies that hamper its deployment.
        All of us know that success in deploying the hybrid Mission depends on providing for its requirements so that it can discharge its tasks. That is a sine qua non, a precondition to ameliorate the humanitarian and security conditions in Darfur and to improve the chances for success of the political process.
        Participants at the Geneva meeting on 5 June under the chairmanship of the two mediators expressed their disappointment over the late deployment of the force as well as the adverse consequences resulting therefrom on the political process. The two mediators emphasized this fact in the Council this morning as well.
        It is regrettable that, despite the efforts deployed, particularly by the two Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the political process has not achieved even a modicum of progress; rather, it has deteriorated. Some rebel movements refuse to join the political process. Further, they insist on continuing the violence, despite the fact that the Sudanese Government expressed its readiness to engage in dialogue and hastened to declare a unilateral ceasefire, as mentioned at the launching of the Sirte negotiations.
        We believe that greater attention must be directed by this Council to the political process, in addition to supporting the efforts made by the two Envoys, providing propitious circumstances for the launching of the peace process. In our estimation, that requires the following steps. First, there must be an attempt to achieve Sudanese-Chadian reconciliation through the support of the efforts of the contact group that was formed as a result of the Dakar Agreement. On that score, I agree with Mr. Salim about the impossibility of achieving peace in Darfur if there is no Sudanese-Chadian reconciliation.
        Secondly, persons and groups that refuse to accede to the peace process or seek to achieve a ceasefire with the current measures should be targeted. The Council has hesitated a great deal on this point. Some movements have refused even to engage in mere participation in designated security consultations despite the efforts of the two international mediators and the specific appeals made to them. It would also be useful for the peace process to offer incentives to those who are taking positive stands.
        Thirdly, greater attention to and support for civil society and the traditional leadership are also important. Unfortunately, we have to acknowledge that traditional tribal leaders have tremendous influence, greatly exceeding that of the political leadership. We believe that civil society and the traditional leadership are more eager to achieve peace, stability and security. That is the reality in tribal societies.
        Fourthly, we are in full agreement with the observations made by the participants in Geneva, namely that the continued flow of arms to Darfur unfortunately persists. It is therefore important to redress this matter urgently and effectively.
        In conclusion, I agree with Mr. Eliasson’s statement on the need to agree to the six points he raised. That will undoubtedly have a considerable effect on advancing the peace process.